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Book Reviews

CLASS, STATE, AND CRIME. By Richard Quinney.* David McKay
Company, Inc., New York, New York. 1977. Pp. 179. A Review
Article by Richard M. Pfeffer.t
Richard Quinney's Class, State, and Crime is a courageous,
outrageous, richly illuminating, no-nonsense book with great value
for a wide range of readers. The book simultaneously is a pioneering
effort to understand from a Marxian perspective "the meaning of
criminal justice in theory and practice .

.

. in the United States"

(p.v) and an effort to develop Marxian theory and practice by
exploring the essential meanings of our system of criminal justice.
These inextricably related aspects of the unifying revolutionary
thrust of the book are captured in Quinney's aphoristic conclusion
that "[t]he ultimate meaning of crime in the development of
capitalism is the need for a socialist society" (p. 61).
If that sounds like nonsense, it is supposed to, for the book
breaks with "the conventional ideology of criminal reality" (p. 105),
which we have learned to accept as reality itself. We have been
socialized to exist in a liberal, capitalist society, and like civilized
men and women everywhere, we have thought and been taught to
conceive of the world in ways congruent with and subservient to the
society in which we live. Notwithstanding that most of us have been
led to believe we are familiar enough with Marxian analysis to
justify the ideologically-based contempt we may feel for it, the book's
mode of analysis, its related political standpoint, and its very
language are alien to most of us.
Class, State, and Crime consequently does not lend itself to
presentation in a standard review format. The usual summary
approach would badly misrepresent the book's complex appreciation
and arguments, reducing them to what for an American audience
might sound like a series of slogans. Such a disservice expectably
would only confirm the false sense of familiarity and the attendant
contempt. It would not facilitate communicating what at best is
difficult to communicate: a radically different, yet very useful way of
understanding the world as it exists.
Quinney has attempted to understand our system of criminal
justice in terms of the historical development and current contradictions of capitalism. The book he has written, despite certain flaws
discussed below, is an excellent beginning. For those who already
suspect that something is terribly wrong with our system of criminal
justice and that their own inherited mode of understanding it is

* Visiting Professor, Brown University, specializing in criminology.

t B.A., 1958, Yale University, L.L.B.; 1962 Harvard Law School; Associate

Professor, Johns Hopkins University; Member of the New York State Bar;
author, most recently, of the forthcoming book Working for Capitalism.
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fundamentally inadequate, the value of the book will be apparent.
The problem for them, then, will be what to make of the book's
profound insights.
On one level, the book is the beginning of an answer to a series
of intimately related questions that increasingly impinge upon our
daily lives and consciousness: Why has crime increased so
dramatically in the United States in recent decades? Why have
social controls been intensified? Why do our major economic,
political, and social institutions increasingly seem unable to solve
our most serious life problems? Why is the state in a period of
endemic fiscal crisis? Why do people daily feel more alienated and
powerless? Why, in short, must crime be understood in terms of what
our society as a whole has become? And how might crime complexly
relate to what may become of America?
Class, State, and Crime is organized into five chapters, entitled
"Criminal Justice in Capitalist Society," "Crime and the Development of Capitalism," "Class Struggle and the Capitalist State,"
"The Political Economy of Criminal Justice," and "Beyond Criminal
Justice." The American system of criminal justice is presented by
Quinney as a necessary development and "principal feature" of
advanced capitalist society. Where solutions to societal problems
cannot be found, controls must be imposed. Criminal justice as we
know it, is a response to certain severe problems created, but not
resolvable by late capitalism.
In chapter one, Quinney seeks to demystify our history by
exposing that "capitalist justice secures the capitalist system" (p. 2).
Notions of justice, he argues, are not transcendent absolutes, but are
"materially based" and "rooted in social existence." American
justice "plays a crucial role in establishing and perpetuating social
order" and is "an ideological and practical instrument in class
struggle" (pp. 1-2). The prevailing notion of criminal justice
"protect[s] acknowledged 'rights' within the current order and ...
distribut[es] punishment according to desert" (p. 22). This is
altogether different from an "idea of justice as distribution according
to need" (p. 22).
The meaning and function of capitalist justice is embedded in
innovations during the last decade in the system of social control,
now euphemistically referred to as "the criminal justice system."
This system was established to combat the crime that is rising with
capitalism's deepening crisis. The criminal justice movement is "a
state-initiated and state-supported effort to rationalize mechanisms
of social control" (p. 10). Involved are new technologies of crime
prevention, alternatives to formal legal processing, citizen participation in crime control, and ideological justifications for intensified
social control. The thrust of these justifications is to make swift and
certain punishment of those defined as criminals appear "morally
tolerable" and rational. Based upon a "new utilitarianism," this is
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an "attempt to reestablish a justice appropriate to a former age" of
capitalism in the hope of preserving "the contemporary capitalist
order" (p. 23).
What is singularly missing from the social theory and sociological research in support of this movement is a "critical understanding." The existing social order is taken as a given, and within it
repression is justified: "Punishment becomes the solution when our
vision is confined within the problem itself' (p. 20). The irony of the
solution, of course, is that it "can only exacerbate the conditions of
our existence" (p. 17). To go beyond the capitalist confines of the
problem and to introduce a "critical understanding" and an
appreciation of "how things could be" requires Marxism. For,
"Marxism is the one philosophy of our time that takes as its primary
focus the [inherent] oppression of capitalist society. It is the one
analysis that is historically specific and locates contemporary
problems in the existing political economy" (p. 25). Marxism,
Quinney argues, transcends the narrow "juridical or legal" boundaries of the concept of justice which "fails to grasp the material
conditions, the real basis of society" (p. 26). To comprehend our
system of criminal justice, we must understand it in 'its necessary
and historically specific relation to the American capitalist system
of exploitation, which "depends on 'surplus value,' on unpaid labor."
And we must come to understand "capitalism as a whole and. . . its
position in human history" (p. 27).
Thus we are forewarned that what follows in Class, State, and
Crime is radically different in scope and focus from the conventional
offerings of leading theorists of crime and social control. Since
"crime is basically a material problem" (p. 31), the study of crime,
Quinney states early in chapter two, must involve "an investigation
of such natural products and contradictions of capitalism as poverty,
inequality, unemployment, and the economic crisis of the capitalist
state" (p. 32).
With his sophisticated, dialectical-historical analysis of capitalist development, Quinney explores the basic question of "the
meaning of crime in capitalist society" (p. 33). After a needed but
inevitably insufficient introduction to crucial Marxian concepts and
methods, he argues that in a society in which one class rules on the
basis of its ownership or control of the means of production and its
consequent expropriation of surplus value from another, various
kinds of domination and repression are required to sustain and
reproduce that order. Crime control, as a crucial form of state action
aimed at securing and reproducing the capitalist system of
production and exploitation, "becomes the coercive means of
checking threats to the existing social and economic order, threats
that result from a system of oppression and exploitation" (pp. 45-46).
The use of coercive force, of course, is only one way to maintain
and reproduce society. The manipulation of consciousness to secure
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and legitimate the existing order is a more subtle form of
domination, the need for which also grows out of the innately
conflictual quality of class-based social relationships in capitalist
society:
Those who rule in capitalist society - with the assistance of
the state - not only accumulate capital at the expense of
those who work but impose their ideology as well. Oppression and exploitation are legitimized by the expropriation of
consciousness; since labor is expropriated, consciousness
also must be expropriated. In fact, legitimacy of the
capitalist order is maintained by controlling the consciousness of the population (p. 47).
In order to deal with the problems created by a capitalist
economy, the state has become a "welfare state," providing a variety
of "social services" to help secure the established order. Since, for
example, capitalism systematically produces a surplus population of
unemployed, welfare must be expanded "to control the surplus
population politically" by making it increasingly dependent on the
state (p. 48). But, like all forms of control and manipulation in
capitalist society, welfare is no permanent solution. As Quinney
states, it "cannot completely counter the basic contradictions of a
capitalist political economy" (p. 50). In the long run, he argues,
contradictions intensify, and controls break down.
In the normal course of maintaining the system, crimes of two
basic sorts are committed: crimes of domination and crimes of
accommodation. Crimes of domination include those committed by
police in the course of state control, economic crimes such as those
relating to price fixing and pollution, Watergate-type crimes by
officials, and crimes of warfare and the like.
In response to this domination, the exploited class commits acts
of accommodation and resistance. Their crimes, consciously or not,
stand "in relation to the capitalist order of exploitation and
oppression" (p. 53). Many of their crimes of accommodation are
parasitical in nature, "predatory crimes" like burglary, generally
committed "out of a need to survive" (p. 54). Others are "personal
crimes" like rape, commonly "directed against members of the same
class ...

by those ...

already brutalized by the conditions of

capitalism" (p. 54). Particularly for the unemployed, the thwarting of
basic human needs leads to psychic disturbance and "outright acts
of personal and social destruction" (p. 57). Unemployment produces
criminality, epitomizing the more general proposition that most
"crimes among the working class ...

are actually ...

an attempt to

exist in a society where survival is not assured by other, collective
means" (p. 58).
With the state on the side of the capitalist class, much of the
history of working class struggle against capitalist conditions of
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production and life "is defined as criminal" (p. 59). Many crimes, like
sabotage in the workshop, are defensive acts of resistance to the
capitalist system, mostly committed by the working class. When
fully politically conscious, such acts are directed not simply at
aspects of the system but to overthrow it.
The alienation that has its source in the workplace now extends
to all realms of life: "Ownership and control of life in general have
been surrendered to alien hands. The production of life itself under
capitalism is alienated" (pp. 55-56). Crimes of resistance reflecting
pervasive alienation presumably, therefore, occur in various areas of
life. Crime, thus, is related in an historically concrete way to the
intertwined development of capitalist class domination and working
class accommodation/resistance. Within that dialectic, "[v]ariations
in the nature and amount of crime occur in the course of developing
capitalism. Each stage in the development of capitalism is
characterized by a particular pattern of crime. The meaning and
changing meanings of crime are found in the development of
capitalism" (p. 61).
To gain a Marxist understanding of crime as predicated on the
political economy of capitalism, one must begin by analyzing this
fundamental, antagonistic relationship between the capitalist and
working classes. Since capitalism is in a constant state of
transformation, however, class analysis of the accompanying
changes in that continuing relationship demands recurrent elaboration. The growth of capitalism, despite certain appearances to the
contrary, has increasingly divided our society into objectively
opposed classes, and inevitably reproduced a pattern of class conflict
that persists even in prosperous times when it is diffuse, complex,
and largely unorganized. This, in turn, Quinney argues in chapter
three, requires under late capitalism that the state regulate class
struggle.
In a very nuanced, if expectably not altogether satisfactory,
discussion of the meaning of class and the nature of class structure
in the United States today, Quinney argues, as Marx foresaw, that
"the overwhelming proportion of the population of advanced
capitalism consists of the working class" (p. 76). Notwithstanding
much "talk about the 'new middle class' and the 'new working
class,"' (p. 76) and notwithstanding the "hierarchical fracturing" of
a working class that reaches from unskilled office, service, and
industrial workers, through skilled workers, to technical workers,
and at its boundaries up into middle-level management, salaried
professionals, and middle-level civil servants (pp. 72-73), proletarianization in fact is being extended to workers in all areas of
economic life. What increasingly is being created is a huge working
class whose members in daily life objectively share more in common
than subjectively divides them.
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Beneath all the regularly employed is an "industrial reserve
army" of unemployed, underemployed, sporadically employed, and
part-time employed, estimated to run as high as 13 million. There are
additional millions without a chance of employment, who, unable to
seek jobs, "are forced on to the welfare rolls." This "pauperized
mass" presently amounts to approximately 15 million human beings
and "is the segment of the working class that readily turns to crime
in the struggle for survival" (p. 71).
Atop these millions is a capitalist class consisting of "relatively
few people": "1.6 percent of the population owns 80 percent of all
corporate stocks and government bonds"; "only slightly over 1
percent of the labor force is composed of corporate owners and toplevel managers" (p. 74). This class peoples and directly or indirectly
dominates our major institutions. Within this capitalist class is a
powerful monopoly sector, numerically comprising about one-third of
the class, which controls or crucially influences the international
and national economies. The purpose of the class as a whole "is to
make the world safe for the capitalist mode of production" (p. 76).
The state is a vital means to that end. Since the state "defines as
criminal that activity which violates the interests the state is
promoting and protecting . . ., [a] theory of crime necessarily
presupposes a theory of the state" (p. 78). A Marxian theory of the
state, Quinney argues, is being reformulated to take account "of the
changing nature of the state under advanced capitalism" (p. 79). The
theoretical problem is to explain in what sense the increasingly
autonomous capitalist state "really is a capitalist state and not
merely a state in capitalist society" (p. 80). Writing as if the
distinction between the simplistic vision of the state as a crude
instrument of capitalist class domination and the more complex
vision of the advanced capitalist state as a coordinating agency
functioning to reproduce capitalist society as a whole (p. 79) was
critical, Quinney quotes with approval a statement by Claus Offe
and Volker Ronge:
The state does not patronize certain interests, and is not
allied with certain classes. Rather, what the state protects
and sanctions is a set of rules and social relationshipswhich
are presupposed by the class rule of the capitalist class. The
state does not defend the interests of one class, but the
common interests of all members of a capitalistclass society
(p. 83).
In becoming "the primary instrument for advancing capitalism" (p. 86), the state is subjected to greater demands for state
action. It has to perform functions that increasingly are contradictory: facilitating private capitalist accumulation and maintaining
the social peace and the system's legitimacy. "Maintaining social
peace while promoting the capitalist social order is both a costly and
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a problematic task" (p. 82) which the state more and more appears
unable to sustain economically. Hence the fiscal crisis of the state
becomes endemic as the capitalist state is torn by contradictions and
crises:
By its very nature, the welfare state generates more
problems than it can solve. It cannot integrate the displaced
population produced by the late capitalist mode of production. More state control and repression become necessary.
The welfare state phase of the capitalist state is in
transition.
What is emerging is a new strategy of capitalist state
policy. The control function of the state is being revised and
expanded. Embodied in this development, however, is a
dialectic between increased control and resistance to that
control. .

.

. The expanded function of the state is a source

of crisis in itself. The attempt by the state to control the
problems generated by late capitalism is the basis of
increased social conflict and political struggle (p.84).
Failure and crisis demand "development of a new mode of
human domination," ideological in the first instance, but also "in
the physical control of our daily lives, in the practice of criminal
justice" (p. 86). Expanded state control, in turn, becomes selfdefeating. It politicizes the struggle between classes and contributes
to "a consciousness that questions the legitimacy of the existing
system" (p. 87). Although capitalist politics, like capitalist work, are
alienated - the people's common power is absorbed by our political
institutions and used to dominate the majority for purposes alien to
it - political alienation intensifies the state's crisis of legitimacy.
Paradoxically, "the capitalist state is weakened by its own
domination" (p. 88).
Alienation will be transcended only when the capitalist state is
rejected and capitalist life is transformed. The problem in the longterm transformation of capitalism into socialism involves "developing a class consciousness in the political struggle" (p. 89). For a
Marxist criminology, it becomes important to understand under
what circumstances and why crime plays positive and negative roles
in the transformation.
In confronting this explosive issue, Quinney does not romanticize crime and criminals. In terms of consciousness, actions by the
working class in response to capitalism "range from unconscious
reactions to exploitation, to conscious acts of survival, to politically
conscious acts of rebellion" (p. 93). Since conscious human activity is
so vital to revolutionary transformation and since consciousness
cannot simply be deduced from "the material conditions of class
experience" (p. 94) but remains "problematic," the crucial issue is
"when and how does crime become a [conscious] force in class
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struggle" (p. 93). Quinney confronts "the problematics of consciousness of criminality" for the revolutionary purpose of assisting "in
the transformation of unconscious criminality into conscious
political activity" (p. 94).
For such purposes we must better understand the specific,
historical circumstances within which particular forms of political
consciousness tend, especially during crises, to develop under
conditions of class oppression. Referring to various historical studies
concerning "primitive" forms of social agitation and the role of
criminality in the revolutionary process, Quinney concludes that
some criminality in particular historical contexts may, but need not
be, "a transition to the further development of political consciousness" (p. 97). Criminality, as Engels saw in his own studies, itself is
contradictory: "criminality is a primitive form of insurrection, a
response to deprivation and oppression." But in itself, criminality "is
not a satisfactory form of politics" (pp. 98-99). Quoting from Steven
Marcus's Engels, Manchester, and the Working Class, Quinney
continues:
Crime is . . . an incomplete but not altogether mistaken
response to a bad situation, . . coming into active existence
only by overcoming the resistance of inherited values and
internalized sanctions. . . . Nevertheless, an inescapable
part of the meaning of crime is its essential failure. It is
insufficiently rational and excessively, or too purely symbolic and symptomatic. Most of all, in it the criminal
remains socially untransformed: he is still an isolated
individual pursuing activities in an underground and
alternate marketplace. . . .In no instance is he capable of
organizing a movement to withstand the institutional forces
that are arrayed against him. He lives in a parallel and
parasitic world whose horizon is bounded and obscured by
the larger society upon which it depends (p. 99).
This failure of crime that does not become a conscious political
force "is contradicted by the fact that for some people criminality is
the beginning of a conscious rebellion against capitalist conditions"
(p. 99). Since the transition from conventional crime to conscious
class struggle occurs in certain communities, in particular stages of
capitalist development under concrete conditions of working-class
life and exploitation, Quinney demands that we engage in appropriate research to better understand and to further this process. In
doing such research, we must remain alive to the implications of
broad changes in the forms of capitalist production, which affect the
kinds of work processes and workers necessary for capitalist
accumulation. Today, for example, so-called "white-collar workers"
have been relegated to a position no longer superior to "blue-collar
workers." Increased white-collar crime, we may hypothesize, "is
committed in response to new forms of labor exploitation" (p. 103).
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If crime must be understood in its relation to the capitalist
system and in its potential contribution to transforming that system,
Quinney concedes that "[m]uch, if not most, crime continues to
victimize those who are already oppressed by capitalism and does
little more than reproduce the existing order" (p. 103). Such crime
"remains counter-revolutionary."
Nevertheless, because social problems produced by capitalism
increase with its development, the state's repressive apparatus
becomes ever more important to regulate class struggle:
Policies of control especially crime control - are
instituted in the attempt to regulate problems and conflicts
that otherwise can be solved only by social and economic
changes that go beyond capitalist reforms. Criminal justice,
as the euphemism for controlling class struggle and
administering legal repression, becomes a major type of
social policy in the advanced stages of capitalism.
Emerging within the political economy of late capitalism is
a political economy of criminal justice (pp. 107-08).
This political economy of criminal justice is the subject of chapter
four.
The criminal justice system "expands to cope as a last resort
with the problems of [the] surplus population" (p. 109). With the
intensification of capitalism's contradictions, expenditures by the
state for criminal justice necessarily have expanded to take up a
greater proportion of the state's budgetary expenses: "Since the
declaration of the war on crime in the mid-1960's, the amount of
money spent on criminal justice has climbed steadily" (p. 109). In the
ten years from 1967-1977, for example, federal expenditures
increased by six times. By fiscal year 1974, a total of nearly $15
billion was spent by all levels of government for criminal justice.
In addition to great increases in the amounts of money spent on
criminal justice, the passage of legislation like the Omnibus Cime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 19681 and the setting up of the /Law
Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) has created a
federally coordinated and "more pervasive organization of criminal
justice" (p. 111). Criminal justice has been "rationalized," 6s
particular functions in criminal justice activity have been differentially developed by each level of government. Local governments, for
example, are the primary supporters of police and the courts, while
state governments are the primary supporters of corrections (p. 114).
The result of these developments "is a coordinated system of legal
repression for advanced capitalist society. For the first time in the
history of the United States, all levels of the state and the various
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3701 et seq. (1968). The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration was established by Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 198 (1968) (codified in 42
U.S.C. §3711 (1968)).
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agencies of the law are linked together in a nationwide system of
criminal justice" (p. 112). More than one million workers are
employed by this criminal justice system; their salaries consume
eighty percent of its funds. The political economy of criminal justice,
thus, is founded upon a contradiction. It is primarily "built on the
labors of the class that is itself the object of criminal justice" (p. 115).
With increased reliance on criminal justice, not itself a source of
surplus value but necessary to secure the capitalist order, "state
expenditures on criminal justice grow faster than the revenues
available to support an expanding criminal justice system" (p. 116).
This generates in the political economy of criminal justice a crisis
that is likely to grow with increasing social problems. To Quinney
this signals the beginning of the end for capitalism: "Embedded in
crisis and contradiction, the criminal justice system as a last resort
signals the imminent demise of the capitalist state and the capitalist
mode of production" (p. 117).
If capitalism's demise indeed is best understood in a time frame
of world history as "imminent," American capitalism, nonetheless,
is not about to roll over and die. The state has formed a symbiotic
relationship with monopolies of the so-called private sector "to
stimulate capital accumulation and stabilize the social order" (p.
117). A "social-industrial complex" has emerged in recent decades as
education, welfare, and criminal justice become new fields in which
monopoly "industries develop programs that simultaneously secure
the social order for the state and improve the productivity and
profitability of the industries themselves, while attempting to make
a safe environment for continued capitalist development" (p. 118).
The "criminal justice-industrial complex," an important part of
this growing "social-industrial complex," has expanded steadily
since the mid-1960's, producing technocratic solutions for the
problem of controlling the domestic population. Under the direction
of LEAA, the criminal justice system is becoming capital intensive,
with science, technology, and industry being directed toward the
home front as they have been directed toward "scientific warfare
abroad." LEAA, thus, is a response not only to the increased need
for social control but also to the fiscal crisis of the state. In fostering
the alliance between the state and monopoly industries, LEAA seeks
to "reverse the economic burden, and possible crisis, of the social
expense of controlling crime ... by making social expenditures
profitable for private industry" (p. 121). Ever more discernable, state
collusion with monopoly industries contributes, however, not only to
capital investment in criminal justice but also to weakening
capitalism's legitimacy. Like military spending, "criminal justice
spending is only a partial, temporary, and self-defeating resolution
to capitalist economic contradictions" (p. 124).
Crime is an integral, pervasive, and normal part of our political
economy. Although the direct and indirect costs of crime to the
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society as a whole are extremely high - U.S. News & World Report,
which Quinney cites for his figures, estimated economic costs at
nearly $90 billion in 1974 - in a pathological social order, crime
involves a kind of devil's utility: "hundreds of thousands of people
find employment in fighting crime and hundreds of thousands find
economic support through offenses and economic security while
being confined in prison, at the same time lowering the unemployment rate of the society" (p. 129).
This, of course, is only another way of reiterating that what we
generally think of as crime is the response of a surplus population
produced by capitalism. These millions cannot be absorbed by the
political economy but can only be supervised and managed. And, as
"[t]he notion that the social problems generated by capitalism can be
solved becomes obsolete" (p. 132), we come to accept the existence of
crime as inevitable. The issue, then, is reduced to how best to control
it. Strong-arm techniques are complemented by community relations
techniques aimed at securing popular acceptance and support.
Ultimately, "pacification" is what is desired: "The surplus population is not only to be controlled, but it is to accept this control" (p.
133).
Whether the ultimate is achieved, the surplus population clearly
is the main target for increased control, especially in periods of
economic crisis. Consequently, imprisonment cannot be understood
in its political-economic function when prisons are conceived, in
terms that filter out the significance of class, simply as places "for
incarcerating criminals." The fact is "prisons are differentially
utilized according to the extent of economic crisis ....
[T]he prison
population increases as the rate of unemployment increases" (p.
136). With unemployment growing between the end of 1973 and early
1976, for example, the number of prisoners in state and federal
prisons rose by more than 20 percent.
By means of class analysis, the essential meaning of prisons in
our political economy is revealed:
Prisons in this country are used mainly for those who
commit a select group of crimes, primarily burglary, robbery,
larceny, and assault. Excluded are the criminals of the
capitalist class, who cause more of an economic and social
loss to . .. the society but who are not often given prison
sentences. This means that prisons are institutions of
control for the working class, especially the surplus
population of the working class (p. 138).
Among blacks, who make up a disproportionate part of the surplus
population, the impact of prisons is still more dramatic: "About one
out of every four black men in their early twenties spends some time
in prison, jails, or on probation" (p. 138).
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In the context of increased crime, rising social expenditures for
criminal justice, and explosively overcrowded prisons, so-called
"sentencing reforms" aimed mainly at mandatory, fixed, and
reduced sentencing will facilitate imprisoning more people with
certainty for shorter periods. Hence, "[p]rison reform actually means
that control of the surplus population can be increased, for the time
being, within the social expense limits of the criminal justice
system" (p. 139).
Such "reforms" are indicative, of a broader, current tendency in
criminal justice reflected in the proposed revision of the federal
government's criminal code. The crime bill, among other things,
widens state control, restricts political participation by citizens, and
further expands the federal government's role in criminal justice.
These solutions, beset by contradictions, cannot endure:
"Strengthening the criminal justice system only strengthens the
larger system that generates crime in the first place" (p. 143). The
only real solution, therefore, is to transcend criminal justice by
building a socialist society, which will cease "to generate the crime
found in capitalist society" (p. 144).
Thus, Quinney moves into his concluding chapter and "Beyond
Criminal Justice," which is understood as "the characteristic form of
control in advanced capitalist society" (p. 145). Beyond criminal
justice lies the transition to socialism, and then socialism, itself a
long-term revolutionary transition to communism. The author's
stimulating discussion of the transition to socialism is predicated
upon his understanding of the final development of American
capitalism. Because of the intimate relationship between the present
and the future - between American capitalism and American
socialism - our capitalism is the source for our sort of socialism,
both in theory and in practice. "A theory of the late development of
capitalism," Quinney writes, "is simultaneously a theory of the
transition to socialism" (p. 154). In practice, new forms of production
and social relations develop concretely out of the existing realities of
a capitalism unable to resolve its own contradictions.
The transition to socialism involves, for example, an interaction
between the sorts of labor American society actually has created "in
response to the changing requirements of capital accumulation" (p.
153). The large, unproductive labor force employed by government in
order to stabilize and legitimize our capitalist system represents a
"noncapitalist mode of production" and, in some manner Quinney
does not make entirely clear, becomes "the source of presocialist or
early socialist labor" (p. 155). This same contradiction between the
growing portion of the labor force, in and out of government, that in
Marxian terms is unproductive and the declining portion of the labor
force that is productive, viewed from another angle, signals the
exhaustion of the potential in capitalist relations, which classically
come to constrain further development of capitalist forces of
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production. As unproductive labor increases, "the appropriation of
surplus value . . . decreases. Surplus value as the source of capital
accumulation declines at the expense of maintaining the capitalist
system. This is the grave, and fatal, contradiction of late capitalism"
(p. 155).
The intensification and resolution of capitalism's contradictions
will not, contrary to widely cherished distortions of Marx's
materialism, be unfolded as a mechanical working out of History.
Human beings make their own history within the limits provided by
objective, material conditions. Hence, "only with the actions of real,
living human beings struggling against the oppressive conditions of
capitalism can there be a socialist revolution" (p. 159).
Critical social theory has a vital role to play in this struggle, in
developing understanding and correct political action. Such theory,
if grounded in the daily lives of those masses of people who are
oppressed by existing conditions, can help develop their consciousness of the systemic sources of their oppression and enable them to
decide for themselves to change that system. In using social science
and social theory to critically illuminate people's lives, instead of to
control people, the way is open in the practice of socialist revolution
for people to expropriate justice, social science, and social theory
from the elites who presently control them and to appropriate them
for their own use - to develop "popular justice" (p. 162) instead of
"criminal justice" and social science and theory that are part of
people's everyday lives instead of the property of social scientists
and their employers.
Class, State, and Crime was written as a contribution to this
process of transforming our world and ourselves. By understanding
capitalist justice, the book offers a basis for rejecting it: "The importance of criminal justice is that it moves us dialectically to reject
the capitalist order and to struggle for a new society" (p. 165). With
that goal of revolutionary transformation as the standard for
evaluation, the book's great strengths are various and undeniable,
but its interrelated shortcomings are not unimportant.
In the first place, there is the problem of audience. This
theoretical book manifestly is written for those very elites who, in
the admittedly long-term process of revolution, must learn to share
their theoretical knowledge with "ordinary people," who in turn will
share their empirical knowledge with elites. Although it is extremely
difficult in a society so fragmented by an advanced capitalist
division of labor as ours to write theory in a manner to make it
accessible to "ordinary people," it is necessary to make the effort.
Mao Tse-tung, whom Quinney several times quotes favorably, did
this brilliantly in a less advanced society. Quinney, by contrast,
gives no evidence here of having tried. In that sense, his scholarship
remains "academic" and deserves to be criticized, especially since
many of the millions of people who constitute the targets of our
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criminal justice system may already inchoately sense the need to
better understand the system that oppresses them.
Relatedly, the book communicates very little of the concrete
patterns of daily life of the oppressed upon which a Marxist theory
of crime appropriate to the United States must be grounded. The
revolutionary theory, in other words, is too separated from the
mundane details of capitalist practice out of which it grows and for
which it is the beginning of a solution. For both of the above
reasons, Class, State, and Crime is unlikely to contribute directly to
raising the consciousness of the oppressed.
But perhaps that is too much to demand in this time and place of
an American academic, even of a revolutionary one. And perhaps,
too, given the divisions within our society, one cannot reach the core
oppressed through books. How successful, then, is the book as a
communication to those we normally think of as members of the
elite?
For Marxist lawyers and intellectuals, reading Class, State, and
Crime will be a confirmatory and enriching experience. It will
deepen their understanding of a particular aspect of the capitalist
whole, and thereby their understanding of the whole, while bringing
them up to date on recent relevant developments in Marxist theory.
But for such Marxists, the book poses serious theoretical problems
that, if not created by Quinney, also are not adequately confronted
by him. How, for example, can the surplus population that is a
primary focus of this book, as well as those millions of other workers
not engaged in "productive" work, none of whom produce surplus
value, be "exploited" in Marx's sense? What are the implications for
Marxist analysis of describing the state as "semiautonomous?" And
does this characterization mean something more than that the state,
even while under the domination of the ruling class, necessarily
develops partly in response to the effective demands of the working
class, and therefore cannot be appreciated out of the context of class
struggle crudely and exclusively as a tool of the ruling class? And
why, if most crime objectively is counter-revolutionary, does the
state increasingly have to regulate it?
For non-Marxist readers the book can be a revelation. But to
many it may appear as a gauntlet thrown down, which they simply
decline to pick up. If so, their refusal to accept the challenge may be
attributable in part to Quinney's insufficient attention to the
difficulties of communicating with people who not only appreciate
the world very differently but, in addition, still essentially experience
their own world view as "natural," effectively as the only one
conceivable. The problems of communicating across world views can
hardly be exaggerated. But it is the responsibility of Marxists who
themselves usually have undergone a radical change of consciousness to somehow communicate to those who have not the profound
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implications of what is involved. Quinney does not do as much in
this regard as he might have.
For one thing, he does not adequately anticipate expectable
misreadings of his relentlessly argued thesis. His central argument
that crime and criminal justice are the product of capitalism "[c]rime in all its aspects ... is the price the capitalist system pays
for capitalism" (p. 130) - is all too likely to be misread as suggesting
the notion that crime is unique to capitalism. Quinney, therefore,
should have explicitly indicated that crime in all sorts of classdominated societies must be understood in relation to the prevailing
political economy. Had he clarified this historical perspective, he
might then, instead of merely asserting, have shown concretely how
and why the pattern of crime has changed, as feudalism was
transformed into early capitalism and as capitalism developed to
date through its various stages.
For another thing, references to the quality of justice in societies
conventionally considered socialist are, without explanation, almost
entirely absent from the book. Since we know crime persists in such
societies, this silence for non-Marxists, at least, may be deafening.
Finally, a number of Quinney's arguments will appear to nonMarxists simply as ipse dixits. Given the monumental scale of the
issues and the conflicting world views involved, this to a substantial
degree is inevitable. Quinney simply cannot afford the effort
necessary to persuade even receptive non-Marxists on every point.
Still, certain of the more naked assertions are basic to his Marxist
argument and simultaneously fly in the face of widely accepted
"truths" to the contrary. On these points, such as the assertion that
exploitation has increased with capitalist development (p. 92),
evidence and more argument are needed if the assertions are to
persuade and are not to be perceived as yet another confirmation
that what readers think is rational and what Marxists think is
"ideological."
If these criticisms of Class, State, and Crime are justified, then
the book, not surprisingly, is intellectually and politically flawed. It
remains, however, an outstanding contribution to our stunted
understanding of the capitalist political economy of crime. Richard
Quinney, by his masterful use of dialectical analysis, has taken the
matter of criminal justice out of its parochial domains and placed it
in the proper historical perspective.

